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ABSTRACT 
 
Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will 
and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will 
is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this 
power. Their new argument does, however, depend upon a general thesis of the 
incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. I argue that Mumford and 
Anjum have provided no justification for this general thesis. As a consequence, their new 
argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism is unsuccessful.  
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Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism 
 
 
Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum (2014) have presented a striking new argument for 
the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. A distinctive feature of their 
argument is that although it depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise 
of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. On the contrary, 
Mumford and Anjum claim that if causal determinism is true, there are no (causal) powers. 
Their new argument depends upon a general thesis of incompatibilism about causal powers 
– including dispositions such as fragility, solubility, and so on, where these are construed 
as causal powers. Hence, if Mumford and Anjum are correct, their argument has 
implications that go far beyond the free will debate. 
I shall argue that Mumford and Anjum have provided no justification for their 
thesis of the incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. As a consequence, 
they have not succeeded in providing a novel reason to be an incompatibilist about free 
will and causal determinism, even for those who construe free will in terms of the causal 
powers of agents. 
 
 
1. The new argument 
Mumford and Anjum’s new argument is as follows: 
 
(1) If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated. 
(2) If all events are necessitated, there are no powers. 
(3) Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s causal powers. 
Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will. (2014: 21) 
 
Although Premise (3) is controversial, it may be granted for the sake of argument, given 
that the main point of Mumford and Anjum’s article is not to establish this premise, but to 
argue that ‘a powers-based solution [to the free will problem] should come down firmly on 
the side of incompatibilism. Free will as a power . . . should commit one to 
incompatibilism’ (2014: 20–21). I shall discuss Premise (1), including the interpretation of 
the term ‘causal determinism’, later (§5).  For now, it is enough to note that Premise (1) 
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certainly appears plausible, assuming a suitable account of what it is for an event to be 
necessitated.1  
Premise (2), however, is a different matter. As Mumford and Anjum note, it is likely to 
be disputed, even by those who are realists about causal powers (‘powers theorists’) (22). 
Why should the existence of powers be supposed to be incompatible with the thesis that all 
events are necessitated? According to Mumford and Anjum, the reason is the special 
‘dispositional modality’ that is associated with powers, which ‘entails that if an event or 
state of affairs is a matter of necessity then it cannot be the manifestation of a power’ (22; 
my emphasis). In support of this entailment claim, they say: 
 
The basis of the dispositional modality is the thought that causal powers are essentially 
capable of prevention and interference . . . , which shows that they do not necessitate 
their effects or manifestations. Even in the cases of successful causal production, for 
instance when a struck match lights, manifesting its disposition of flammability, it was 
not necessary that it did so. Something could have interfered with the process – water 
could have been thrown on the match before flame took hold – even if as a matter of 
fact it did not do so. Mumford and Anjum (2011: chs 3 and 8) argue that this feature is 
essential to something being a causal power and it follows that if all is necessitated then 
nothing is genuinely powerful in this sense. (2014: 22; my emphasis) 
 
The trouble with this is that the italicized conclusion does not appear to follow, either 
from the considerations Mumford and Anjum explicitly provide in this passage (or 
elsewhere in their 2014 paper), or from those given in their 2011 work (Getting Causes 
from Powers) to which this passage refers. Moreover, it seems that, at the time of writing 
the 2011 work, Mumford and Anjum  themselves thought as much, since in that work they 
explicitly allow that a result might be necessitated even if it is not necessitated by its 
causes, and hence that their powers-based account of causation does not rule out 
determinism. This concession appears in such passages as the following: 
 
Dispositionality is . . . never a source of the necessity of something in the world, even if 
it exists alongside it. In the deterministic case, for instance, where it is necessary that 
                                                 
1 Plausible, that is, if we ignore the fact that causal determinism can allow for initial events in the 
universe (e.g., the Big Bang) that were not caused or necessitated by anything. 
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Fa, that is not because there was a disposition towards it. What delivers the necessity . . 
. is that, somehow, everything got fixed. That will include the fixedness of all the 
background conditions – including which dispositions do, and which do not, act to 
produce the necessitated outcome – but it was not those powers that necessitated that 
outcome. (2011: 178–79; my emphasis) 
 
. . . claim D [the claim that cases of necessity are never cases of dispositionality] should 
not be read as saying that necessity and dispositionality are incompatible absolutely. 
Rather it needs to be read as disposing towards F is never the necessitating of F, even if 
F is for some other reason, necessitated. (2011: 179) 
 
Now, of course, Mumford and Anjum may have changed their minds about this issue. But 
if they have, they don’t explain why. Nor do they even suggest that they have changed 
their minds, which is puzzling, given that they cite, in support of the new incompatibility 
claim, the chapters from Mumford and Anjum 2011 that contain the concessions.2 
 
 
2. The Argument from the Possibility of Interference 
How, then, might one argue that the powers-based account of causation does lead to the 
desired conclusion (Premise (2)) – that if everything is necessitated, there are no (causal) 
powers – given that the argument appears to be absent from Mumford and Anjum 2011 
and 2014?  
There is a major obstacle to providing such an argument. Consider the kind of case 
to which Mumford and Anjum appeal when arguing that causing is not necessitating (and 
for a dispositional modality that falls short of necessitating). Their argument depends on 
the idea that the particular causes (c1–cn, say) that produce a particular effect e (as, for 
example, when a struck match lights, manifesting its disposition of flammability) are 
compatible3 with there being some ‘interferer’ (or ‘preventer’) – an ‘additive interferer’ – 
                                                 
2 The two passages I have quoted are from ch. 8 of Mumford and Anjum 2011. See also ch. 3: 64. 
 
3 In its initial version, Mumford and Anjum’s ‘antecedent-strengthening’ argument for the 
conclusion that causes do not necessitate their effects does not assume that the addition of the 
interferer be compatible with c1–cn. They say: ‘If A necessitates B, we should have a true 
conditional of the form if A and ϕ, then B, for any value of ϕ’ (2011: 57; my emphasis), which 
implies that in cases of necessitation the conditional should survive antecedent strengthening even 
when ϕ has a value that entails not-A. When discussing the implications of interference, however, 
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such that, had that interferer been present, then even if all the causes had still been present, 
the result would not have occurred (2011: 53–58, 60–63).4 This is supposed to show that 
the causes of the match’s lighting cannot be said to necessitate the lighting, since if they 
did, they would have produced the lighting even if the interferer had been present, which is 
obviously not so. In other words, according to Mumford and Anjum, in order to necessitate 
an effect, the causes would have to be on their own sufficient for that effect, which the 
possibility of interferers shows not to be the case. They dismiss the suggestion that a cause 
might be said to necessitate an effect by being ‘sufficient in the circumstances’, an 
expression that they regard as an oxymoron (2011: 70). Let us call this argument for the 
conclusion that causes never necessitate their effects – that causing is never necessitating – 
‘the Argument from the Possibility of Interference’.5  
Mumford and Anjum need to establish that it follows, from their thesis that – 
because of the possibility of interference – causing is never necessitating, that if something 
is necessitated, it is not caused. An obstacle to establishing this is evident. Even if we 
accept that, if there had been an (additive) interferer or preventer I, such that, had it been 
combined with the actual causes of e, this would have resulted in the non-occurrence of e, 
we still need to consider: might it not have been determined, and hence necessitated, that I 
was absent? Let us grant that, if there had been a gust of wind, the match would not have 
lit, even if all the factors that in fact caused it to light had still been present.6 And let us 
grant, at least for the sake of argument, that this shows that the causes of the lighting of the 
match were not, strictly, sufficient to produce the lighting (i.e., did not necessitate the 
                                                 
Mumford and Anjum suggest that their argument against causal necessitation would be weakened 
(and the antecedent-strengthening argument undermined) if the only ‘interferers’ were 
‘subtracting’ factors that removed one or more of the original causes (2011: 60). They rest their 
case on the possibility of ‘additive interferers’ – i.e., interferers that are compatible with the 
existence of the original causes. The fact that Mumford and Anjum’s original antecedent-
strengthening argument requires that the conditional remain true even if its antecedent is 
‘strengthened’ in a way that makes it inconsistent is the basis of a criticism by Lowe (2012).  
 
4  Mumford and Anjum sometimes make a distinction between ‘preventing’ and ‘merely 
interfering’, where the latter involves the modification, rather than the elimination, of an effect 
(2011: 54). This distinction is irrelevant to my discussion here, and I shall ignore it. 
 
5 I call it this, rather than ‘the antecedent-strengthening argument’, because of the problems about 
the interpretation of the notion of antecedent-strengthening mentioned in my previous note 3. 
 
6 This obviously depends on the assumption that the absence of a gust of wind is not one of the 
causes of the lighting. But Mumford and Anjum have arguments that such absences cannot be 
causes (2011: ch. 6, §7).  
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lighting). It does not follow, from this alone, that the lighting was not necessitated. For 
suppose it was determined, and thus necessitated, that no gust of wind was present. If so, it 
was necessitated that the lighting was not prevented by a gust of wind. And if it was 
determined, and thus necessitated, that all of the potential interfering factors were absent, 
then it was necessitated that there was no interferer. Suppose, in addition, that it was 
determined, and hence necessitated, that all the actual causes were present. If so, how 
could it fail to be determined, and hence necessitated, that the causes did produce the result 
to which they were disposed – namely, the lighting?  
There is one way in which this necessitation could fail, but it is of no use to 
Mumford and Anjum. If the causes c1–cn constitute a set of dispositions that produce their 
effect e via indeterministic causation, then the following situation is possible: all of c1–cn 
are present, and no interfering factor is present, and yet e does not occur. If there are 
irreducibly indeterministic causal dispositions,7 then even if there is enough for an effect to 
occur, the effect may still not occur, even in the absence of interfering factors. However, 
Mumford and Anjum explicitly reject any appeal to indeterministic causation in their 
argument that causes do not necessitate their effects. If they were to appeal to 
indeterministic causation, this would make their Argument from the Possibility of 
Interference redundant. Moreover, were they to appeal to indeterministic causation, rather 
than to the possibility of interference, for their conclusion that causes never necessitate 
their effects, they would be committed to the thesis that all causation involves irreducibly 
indeterministic dispositions, something that they provide no reason whatsoever to believe.8  
Interestingly, Mumford and Anjum’s own vector diagrams for the representation of 
powers-based causation seem apt to illustrate the problem they face from the suggestion 
that the absence of interferers might be necessitated. For the vector diagrams can represent 
the absence of a gust of wind (and of any other factor that would, if it were present, 
                                                 
7 I use ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ interchangeably when describing Mumford and Anjum’s account, 
following their endorsement (2011: 4) of this equivalence. 
 
8 ‘[T]he argument against necessity does not depend on there being probabilistic causation [a sub-
category of indeterministic causation]’ (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 77) or on there being 
‘irreducibly indeterministic dispositions’ (2011: 76). ‘[T]he argument against causal 
necessitarianism does not rest . . . on indeterministic causation being the case. . . . [I]t is consistent 
with the . . . argument against necessity that if two tokens of the same dispositions were placed in 
identical contexts . . . they would produce identical manifestations. The argument against necessity 
required only that if something had been different, the manifestation need not have occurred.’ 
(2011: 76) 
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dispose against a result) simply by failing to represent it by a vector on the diagram (cf. 
2011: 72–74). Unless at least some of the relevant dispositions that are present are 
indeterministic ones (which, according to Mumford and Anjum, is not the typical case), 
then the dispositions that are present will generate a resultant power or disposition that 
does, or does not, meet a ‘threshold’ that represents enough for the result to occur (ibid.).9 
But if there is enough for the result to occur, and there are no indeterministic dispositions 
in play, and there are no interfering or preventing factors, then it seems undeniable that the 
result will occur. 
To sum up: even if the Argument from the Possibility of Interference does establish 
that (in a relevant sense of ‘necessitate’) the causes of an effect e never necessitate e, it 
cannot establish that effects are never necessitated, unless it is supplemented with an 
additional argument for the following thesis: in every case of the causing of some effect e, 
either (a) it is not necessitated that all interferers to the production of e are absent, or (b) it 
is not necessitated that all the causes of e are present.  
But do Mumford and Anjum have the resources to provide the crucial 
supplementary argument? I shall argue that they do not.  
 
 
3. The ‘possibility’ of interference 
It might be suggested that Mumford and Anjum have an easy way to establish that even if 
all interferers to the production of e are in fact absent, this cannot be something that is 
necessitated. Might they not argue as follows? ‘The Argument from the Possibility of 
Interference involves the assumption that, for every case of causing, there is some possible 
interferer. But if the absence of an interferer I is necessitated, I is not a possible interferer. 
Hence, if the Argument from the Possibility of Interference is sound, then there must be, 
for every case of causing, some potential interferer whose absence is not necessitated.’ 
It is, I hope, obvious that Mumford and Anjum are not entitled to this line of 
reasoning. If we were to construe the Argument from the Possibility of Interference as 
requiring that a potential interferer be possible in the sense of ‘not-necessitated-not-to-
occur’, the Argument would be entirely precarious. It would rest on an anti-deterministic 
                                                 
9 In a case where a match is struck and (as a result) lights, Mumford and Anjum are committed to 
the possibility of representing, on a vector diagram, all the causes of the lighting, including a cause 
that corresponds to the striking (2011: 32–33). The details of this account are not my concern here.  
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assumption – the non-necessitation of the absence of relevant interferers – that we have 
been given no reason to accept. In other words, if we assume that relevant interferers must 
be possible in the ‘not-necessitated-not-to-occur’ sense, the Argument would illegitimately 
beg the question against the possibility of determinism.10  
What this makes clear, however, is that we must distinguish the following claims:  
 
Weak possibility of interference: For any case where causes c1–cn produce an effect e, 
there is some interferer I such that: I was absent, but if I had been present, the effect e 
would not have occurred, even if all the causes of e (c1–cn) had still been present.11 
 
Strong possibility of interference: For any case where causes c1–cn produce an effect e, 
there is some interferer I such that: I was absent, it was not necessitated that I was 
absent, and if I had been present, the effect e would not have occurred, even if all the 
causes of e (c1–cn) had still been present. 
 
The considerations that Mumford and Anjum provide in support of their Argument from 
the Possibility of Interference warrant, at most, a version of the Argument that involves the 
weak, as opposed to the strong, sense of the possibility of interference. This vindicates my 
initial verdict (§2 above) that Mumford and Anjum’s Argument from the Possibility of 
Interference does not, by itself, establish that the absence of all interferers is not 
necessitated. 
 
 
4. Kinds of necessitation 
What, then, would it take to establish that, in every case of causing, either (a) the absence 
of all interferers is not necessitated, or (b) the presence of all the causes is not necessitated, 
                                                 
10 A point that Mumford and Anjum (2011) appear to acknowledge when discussing the connection 
between determinism and the Argument from the Possibility of Interference: see, for example, 
2011: 63–64. 
 
11 The language that I use here (and elsewhere in this paper) may suggest that I believe that there 
are (possible) interferers such as a particular possible gust of wind that did not occur, but might 
have done. I intend no commitment to such particular possibilia. I am confident, however, that any 
phrases that I use that suggest this can be reformulated in a way that clearly avoids the 
commitment. 
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given that the Argument from the Possibility of Interference, in its non-question-begging 
form, does not by itself deliver this result? 
There is a potentially distracting complication to be set aside. As Mumford and 
Anjum formulate their new argument for incompatibilism, its Premise (2) appears to 
employ an unqualified notion of the necessitation of events (cf. §1 above). Yet it would 
seem uncharitable to require Mumford and Anjum to argue that their powers-based 
conception of causation rules out the kind of necessitation (of the absence of interferers 
and the presence of causes) that is associated with, say, logical or theological fatalism. 
Presumably, what Mumford and Anjum had in mind, in formulating Premise (2), was not 
every kind of universal event-necessitation, but rather, the kind of universal event-
necessitation that would be the case if causal determinism were true. But what kind of 
necessitation is this?  
 
 
5. Causal determinism and necessitation 
According to Mumford and Anjum, their new argument concerns only ‘determinism as it 
should be understood by those who are serious about powers’ (2014: 21). They are not, for 
example, concerned with a conception of determinism such as that articulated by David 
Lewis, according to which it is the thesis ‘that if two worlds with the same laws of nature 
coincide in their histories until time t, then they will do so after t’, since determinism 
understood in this way is ‘conducive to a package of Humean metaphysics that the realist 
about causal powers will reject’ (22).  
The kind of determinism they have in mind is, they say, one that ‘[has] causation as 
its vehicle’ (21) or ‘[resides] in an all-encompassing web of causation’ (22). An example 
they give to illustrate this is the thesis that ‘every state or event is causally necessitated by 
preceding states or events’ (21; citing Watson 1982: 2).    
But now a problem is evident. Suppose that, by ‘causal determinism’, Mumford 
and Anjum mean a view that includes, in its definition, the thesis that events are 
necessitated by their causes, in a sense of ‘necessitate’ that would conflict with the 
Argument from the Possibility of Interference. If so, then, of course, causal determinism is 
immediately ruled out, on the powers-based conception of causation, by Mumford and 
Anjum’s thesis that, because of the possibility of interference, causal powers do not 
necessitate their effects. But to establish that causal determinism, in this restricted sense, is 
ruled out by the powers-based conception of causation would be a comparatively trivial 
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result, and a hollow victory. Why so?12 It is no surprise that the thesis that causes do not 
necessitate their effects is incompatible with causal determinism if causal determinism is 
defined as a thesis that requires a necessitation relation between causes and their effects. 
However, if one accepts, as Mumford and Anjum must do, that even if absences are not 
themselves causes, the absence of potential interferers is relevant to causation (since it 
makes a difference to whether a given set of causal powers produces an effect), it seems 
inappropriate to adopt a definition of causal determinism that ignores the role of these 
causally relevant features merely on the grounds that, being absences, they do not count as 
causes.13 But that is precisely what Mumford and Anjum would be doing if they were to 
take causal determinism to be the thesis that ‘every state or event is causally necessitated 
by preceding states or events’ (see above) and combine it with an interpretation of 
‘causally necessitate’ that requires that events be necessitated (solely) by their causes (in a 
sense that conflicts with the Argument from the Possibility of Interference).14 
If, however, Mumford and Anjum allow for conceptions of causal determinism that 
do not include, in their definition, the thesis that events are necessitated by their causes (in 
a sense that would conflict with the Argument from the Possibility of Interference), then 
they confront, once again, the question why we should suppose that, in every case of the 
causing of some effect e, either (a) it is not necessitated (by causal determinism) that all 
interferers to the production of e are absent, or (b) it is not necessitated (by causal 
determinism) that all the causes of e are present. 
Mumford and Anjum are not, I submit, entitled to assume that there is no such 
relevant conception of causal determinism. An obvious candidate is indicated by one of the 
characterizations of determinism that Mumford and Anjum appear to endorse, according to 
which ‘an event is determined just in case there are conditions whose joint occurrence is 
                                                 
12 Thanks to an anonymous referee for inviting me to expand my argument here. 
 
13 See note 6 above. 
 
14 The passage from Watson 1982 cited by Mumford and Anjum does not support an interpretation 
of ‘causally necessitate’ that would conflict with their thesis that causes do not necessitate their 
effects. In the cited passage, Watson says that determinism is ‘the view, roughly, that every event 
and state of affairs is “causally necessitated” by preceding events and states of affairs’ (1982: 2; 
my emphasis). Watson invites the reader in search of more precise formulations to consult an 
article by van Inwagen (1975) that defines determinism in terms of laws of nature rather than a 
necessitation relation between causes and their effects. 
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sufficient for the occurrence of that event’ (2014: 21, citing Kane 1996: 8). Consider the 
thesis (CD): 
 
(CD): For every time t, the total state of the universe at t, including the total distribution 
of powers (thus including, of course, the existence of any causes and interferers) at t is 
such as to determine a unique total state of the universe, including its total distribution 
of powers, at any later time. 
 
What is it for one state of the universe to determine a subsequent state? Here is a 
suggestion: a total state of the universe S1 at time t determines a total state of the universe 
S2 at time (t + 1) if and only if (i) the operation of the totality of causal powers that are 
present in S1 at t results in the total state S2 at (t + 1); (ii) if the totality of causal powers 
that are present in S1 at t had not resulted in S2 at (t + 1), this could only have been 
because of the presence of some interfering factor; (iii) all potential interfering factors 
were absent.15 
Could a realist about causal powers object to this conception of causal determinism 
on the grounds that it is based on an alien metaphysics? I see no basis for such an 
objection. More generally, I see no reason to exclude this conception from the scope of 
‘determinism as it should be understood by those who are serious about [causal] powers’ 
(2014: 21). If so, however, Mumford and Anjum cannot legitimately avoid the question 
whether causal determinism, so understood, might be true.  
If causal determinism, in the sense of (CD), were true, then a Laplacian demon, 
with complete knowledge of the state S of the universe at t, including the total distribution 
of powers at t, would be able to predict, with certainty, the (unique) state S* of the 
universe at (t + 1) that is the causal consequence of its state at t. Now of course, the demon 
can acknowledge that there are states of the universe at (t + 1) other than S* that are 
possible outcomes of its state S at t in the following sense of ‘possible outcome’: if the 
state of the universe at t had been different, and there had been interferers present at t that 
were in fact absent at t, then the state of the universe at (t + 1) would have been different 
                                                 
15 Determinism is, of course, standardly characterized in terms of laws of nature. See, for example, 
van Inwagen 1983: 3, van Inwagen 1993: 185, McKenna 2009: §1.3, Hoefer 2010: §2, Watson 
2003: 3. I have deliberately avoided characterizing determinism in these terms, however, because 
Mumford and Anjum are sceptical about whether a causal powers theorist should invoke laws of 
nature in addition to causal powers (2011: 99, 104). 
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from what it actually was. But to say that these other (t + 1)-states are ‘possible outcomes’ 
of S at t in this attenuated sense is obviously compatible with its being determined (by the 
actual state S at t) that none of these merely possible outcomes will occur.  
I submit, then, that (CD) is a conception of causal determinism which the powers 
theorist has no reason to treat as an irrelevant conception, and which is compatible with the 
thesis that causes never necessitate their effects, in the only sense in which this non-
necessitation claim is licensed by Mumford and Anjum’s Argument from the Possibility of 
Interference (cf. §3 above). 
What (CD) does appear to rule out, of course, is that the transition of the universe 
from one state to the next ever involves the operation of indeterministic causal powers. But 
as we have seen, Mumford and Anjum’s argument that causal powers never necessitate 
their effects is intended to be compatible with there being no such indeterministic causal 
powers (§2 above).  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Mumford and Anjum fail to provide grounds for the conclusion that their powers-based 
conception of causation rules out causal determinism, even on the assumption that the 
mechanism of causal determinism consists in the operation of causal powers, and even if 
we accept their thesis that, because of the possibility of interference, there is a sense in 
which causal powers never necessitate their effects. The appearance that their Argument 
from the Possibility of Interference may rule out such a version of causal determinism is, I 
have argued, illusory. But if a powers-based conception of causation is compatible with 
causal determinism, Mumford and Anjum’s new argument for the incompatibility of free 
will and causal determinism is undermined.  
It would, of course, be unreasonable to expect Mumford and Anjum to provide a 
full defence of their new argument within the scope of a five-page paper. However, I hope 
to have shown that the only consideration to which they appear entitled to appeal, in 
support of Premise (2) of their new argument – namely, the Argument from the Possibility 
of Interference – is intrinsically incapable of justifying that crucial premise.16 
 
                                                 
16 Thanks to Robert Frazier and to an anonymous referee for Analysis for comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. 
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